

7 October to 1 November 2016 (see annex 3.1). One of these shipments took place on 25 October, and Barre met with senior Puntland officials in Bosaso to organize delivery and receive payment.³

5. On the night of 29 November — when members of the SEMG were on mission in Bosaso — Barre was arrested in Marero, an illicit smuggling point roughly 15 km east of Bosaso, in connection with a small shipment of ammunition and PKMs that had arrived the same night. However, Puntland authorities released Barre shortly thereafter, apparently because they discovered that shipment was destined for the Puntland government.⁴ An SEMG request to Bosaso port police to inspect the seized weapons shipment was denied on the grounds that the investigation was ongoing.


6. Barre's mobile phone activity corroborates his involvement in arms smuggling over this period. Between late October and mid-November 2016, Barre exchanged 179 calls with a phone number belonging to a Yemeni arms dealer, who is also an associate of prominent Puntland arms smuggler Abdi Mohamed Omar "Dhofaye" (see "Case study: the *Fatah Al Khayr* and ISIL arms procurement", below).

Bahaya Spare Parts

7. Barre is affiliated with the company Bahaya Spare Parts, a major supplier of automotive spare parts in Puntland, with at least three locations in Bosaso and additional branches in Garowe and Galkayo (see figure 4, below, for a photograph of the flagship store in Bosaso). Bahaya is owned by a parent company based in Dubai, Bahaya General Trading Co. LLC, of which Barre's father and brother, Ahmed Mohamed Barre and Mahamoud Mohamed Barre, are part owners (see figure 5).

8. Figure 3, below, displays the mobile phone activity for Abshir Mohamed Barre from December 2016 to June 2017. Over that period, Barre had numerous contacts with his arms trafficking partner, Ahmed Yasin Salah, the former Puntland deputy minister of finance. Barre's link chart also shows contacts with other known arms smugglers, including Buruj Mohamed Ali Farah and Said Yusuf Timowayne Mohamed a.k.a. Said Atto (see "Case study: the *Fatah Al Khayr* and ISIL arms procurement", below), as well as another reputed arms dealer, Mohamed Bayre (Darod/Harti/Deshishe). Barre also shows contacts with three members of the Qandala-Hafun arms smuggling network: Abdilatif Yusuf Barre, Said Gul Ismail, and Abdifatah Hayir (see S/2016/919, annex 8.10).

Figure 3: Phone network analysis of Abshir Mohamed Barre, December 2016-June 2017.



³ Interviews with Puntland intelligence officer, a former Puntland minister, and a UN security source, 28-30 November 2016.

⁴ Information provided by a Puntland intelligence officer, a former Puntland minister, and two UN security sources, 29 and 30 November 2016.

Figure 4: Bahaya Spare Parts flagship store in Bosaso, 8 March 2017.



Figure 5: Ownership of Bahaya General Trading, Dubai, the parent company of Bahaya Spare Parts.

Company Credit Report		24 May 2017 17:49
BAHAYA GENERAL TRADING CO (L.L.C) [CRS No: AEP44337203]		
SHAREHOLDERS		
Name	CRS No	%
Mr. Ahmed Mohammed Bari	[CRS No AEP4462096]	15.00 %
Nationality	Somali	
Mr. Mahmoud Mohammed Bari	[CRS No AEP44879438]	20.00 %
Nationality	Ethiopian	
Mr. Audnan Mahmoud Abdulrahman Mohammed Marzouq	[CRS No AEP4492281]	51.00 %
Nationality	UAE National	
Mr. Hashem Mahmoud Mohammed	[CRS No AEP44749691]	14.00 %
Nationality	Ethiopian	
Total:		100.00%
OPERATION		
Activities Details		
General Trading		
Standard	UK SIC 2003	
Activity	[51.0] - General dealer (wholesale) (Primary)	
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (THE) COUNTRY REPORT SOCIO ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL OVERVIEW		
<p>The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven emirates (subject to principalities) each governed by a hereditary ruler (emir) (see also choice of law among them to be the subject of the report). The constituent emirates are Abu Dhabi (capital), Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah, and Umm al-Qaiwain.</p>		
Cedar Rose Int. Services Ltd, P.O. Box 80751, 3609 Limassol, Cyprus		3 / 5

Case study: the *Fatah Al Khayr* and ISIL arms procurement

9. On 28 April 2017, the Somali-registered general cargo dhow *Fatah Al Khayr* arrived at Bosaso port from Mukalla, Yemen, carrying a cargo of illicit pistols. Prior to arriving at port, the vessel had been interdicted at position 11 26N, 049 32E — approximately 1 km from the Somali coast — by the USS *Hue City*, which subsequently conducted a routine flag verification boarding. However, no contraband was discovered (see figure 9, below).⁵

⁵ Details of the boarding were provided to the SEMG by the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) on 29 August 2017. Additionally, Abdimajid Samatar, Director General of the Puntland Ministry of Ports and Marine Transport, reported that Puntland authorities had been tipped off about the potential arms shipment by information provided by US naval forces. Interview with Abdimajid Samatar in Bosaso, 5 June 2017.

10. On 30 April, the intended recipient of the arms shipment, Abdi Hassan Ali, arrived to collect it, leading the Puntland port police to initiate a full search of the vessel.⁶ Police subsequently discovered 16 illicit pistols and 2,030 rounds of 7.62x25mm pistol ammunition concealed in cartons of dates and bags of rice.⁷

11. A subsequent investigation by the SEMG found that the material discovered at Bosaso port was only one part of a larger arms shipment that had been loaded by skiffs in Shabwa Governorate, Yemen, and subsequently transported to the towns of Mudiye and Habo on Puntland's northeastern coast. A component of that shipment — which included AK-pattern rifles and PK machine guns — was subsequently delivered to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) faction near the town of Unuun in Bari region between 1 and 3 May 2017.

12. The arms shipment was supplied by Yemeni national Khaled Ahmed Ahmed Al-Sand (see figure 6, below, for Ahmed's passport image) and his partner Farah Ismail Ali, a Somali national living in Yemen. On the Somalia side, the shipment was brokered by known arms dealers belonging to the Qandala-Hafun network: Abdi Mohamed Omar "Dhofaye" (Majeerteen/Ali Salebaan/Ismail Ali) and Mahad Isse Aden "Laboballe" (Majeerteen/Ali Salebaan).⁸ Buruj Mohamed Ali Farah (Majeerteen/Ali Salebaan/Ismail Ali), a subordinate of "Dhofaye", subsequently transported the shipment by skiff from Mukalla to the Puntland coast.

Figure 1: Certificate of registration for the dhow Fatah Al Khayr.

PUNTLAND
#BOSASO
#MUKALLA

PUNTLAND
#BOSASO
#MUKALLA

Ministry of Marine Transport & Ports

CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRY

This Certificate is issued by the Ministry of Marine Transport & Ports

R No 141

REGISTER PARTICULAR: Name of Vessel: **FATAH AL KHAYR**

Building Material: Wood	
Length	36.42 M
Breadth	08.90 M
Depth	04.11 M
Gross Tonnage	220.27 Tons
Net Tonnage	200.22 Tons
Engine Caterpillar	671 00 Hp

Name of owner:
Dahir Mohamed Hasan

This Certificate is to be kept on Boat in original or copy and returned to the Bosaso Port Harbour Master when requested.

This Certificate is valid for one year.
Type of Vessel: General Cargo
Issued by Department of Marine Transport
Date of issue February 09/2015.

⁶ Interview with a senior port police officer in Bosaso, 6 June 2017.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ See S/2016/919 annex 8.10 for a description of the Qandala-Hafun network and its prominent members.

Approximate timeline of the *Fatah Al Khayr* shipment

1-7 April: The *Fatah Al Khayr* arrives in Mukalla port, Yemen. It offloads a cargo of livestock and takes on foodstuffs for the return journey to Somalia.

7-9 April: A skiff piloted by Buruj Mohamed Ali Farah travels from Shabwa governorate at Mukalla with a cargo of pistols supplied by Yemen-based Somali arms dealer Farah Ismail Ali. Buruj Farah subsequently rendezvouses with the *Fatah Al Khayr* and transfers the pistols. Farah then returns to Yemen to load heavier weapons, including AK-pattern rifles and PKMs, destined for the ISIL faction, along with a second skiff piloted by an unknown individual.

21 April: The skiff piloted by Buruj Farah arrives in Mudiye, while the second skiff arrives at Habo.

28 April: The *Fatah Al Khayr* is boarded and searched by the USS *Hue City* while en route from Yemen to Somalia, but no contraband is discovered. The same day, the *Fatah Al Khayr* docks in Bosaso port with a legitimate cargo of foodstuffs plus 16 illicit pistols and 2,030 rounds of pistol ammunition destined for sale on the Bosaso black market.

30 April: Abdi Hassan Ali attempts to retrieve the consignment of pistols from the *Fatah Al Khayr* but is arrested by Puntland port police and subsequently transferred to Bosaso Central Prison.

1-3 May: From Mudiye, the bulk of the arms consignment is transported inland to the village of Unuun (11°10'40", 50°25'58"), approximately 50 km south, where it is received by ISIL militants.

13. The *Fatah Al Khayr* presents an illustrative case study of the modalities of a typical arms smuggling operation from Yemen to northern Somalia, which tend to involve small shipments but occur frequently, perhaps as often as several times per month. Phone record analysis of the relevant subjects indicate that the two components of the shipment — the 16 pistols seized at Bosaso port and the ISIL consignment — were brokered by distinct smuggling networks; consequently, the two cases are treated as distinct below.

The Bosaso pistol shipment

14. When the SEMG requested to inspect the captured weaponry on 6 June 2017 in Bosaso, the port police informed the Group that the material had been transferred to Garowe and was therefore unavailable.

15. Abdi Hassan Ali, who was arrested attempting to retrieve the shipment, claimed to represent a consortium of livestock traders who had agreed to exchange their livestock transported aboard the *Fatah Al Khayr* (at a value of approximately \$22,000) for pistols in Yemen.⁹ According to Ali, the pistols were intended to be sold at an illicit market in Bosaso operated by Said Yusuf Timowayne Mohamed a.k.a. Said Atto, a claim corroborated by an analysis of phone records (see 8, below). Bosaso port police reported that they had captured 16 pistols; however, Ali told the SEMG that the consignment had originally consisted of 22 pistols. Ali's account is consistent with the \$22,000 he claimed the consortium had paid for the pistols.¹⁰

16. The *Fatah Al Khayr* is owned by Bosaso-based businessman Dahir Mohamed Hassan and captained by Mohamed Hassan Isaq Osman. Dahir Hassan claimed to have had no knowledge of the smuggling activities of his vessel or captain.¹¹ However, phone records show that preceding and during the smuggling run Hassan was in frequent contact with Abdi Mohamed Omar "Dhofaye", one of two brokers of the ISIL component of the *Fatah Al Khayr* arms shipment. Notwithstanding, the SEMG does not currently assess that Hassan was directly involved in procuring the ISIL shipment.

⁹ Interview with Abdi Hassan Ali in Bosaso Central Prison, 6 June 2017.

¹⁰ The pistols would have sold for approximately \$1,500 each on the Puntland black market, meaning that the consortium and its partners could have expected to earn a profit of roughly \$11,000 on the deal.

¹¹ Interview with Dahir Mohamed Hassan in Bosaso, 7 June 2017.

Figure 2: pistols, packaged in plastic, seized by Puntland port police from the Fatah Al Khayr on 30 April 2017.



17. The pistol seizure consisted of what appear to be 14 NP-42 pistols, as well as two Type 59 copies of the Russian-model Makarov pistols, which can be identified by their brown handgrips. The NP-42s sell for approximately \$1,400 in the illicit arms markets in Bosaso; the Makarovs copies, between \$1,200 and \$1,300.¹² On 3 July 2017, the SEMG sent a tracing request to the relevant Member State for one of the Type 59 pistols seized from the *Fatah Al Khayr* (serial number D07741), but did not receive a reply.

18. Bosaso port police also claimed they seized 29 cardboard boxes of pistol ammunition, containing a total of 2,030 rounds of 7.62x25mm ammunition.¹³ The SEMG identified the markings on the ammunition boxes as Pobjeda Gorazde ammunition plant in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslavia, produced in 1957.

Figure 3: 1 of the 29 ammunition boxes seized off the Fatah Al Khayr by Bosaso port police on 30 April 2017.¹⁴



Figure 4: 7.62 x 25mm round manufactured at Kilmovsk – 711 factory in the former Soviet Union.



¹² Interview with with a senior port police official in Bosaso, 6 June 2017, and a journalist with access to arms markets in Puntland, 8 August 2017.

¹³ Interview with a senior port police official in Bosaso, 6 June 2017.


¹⁴ The SEMG photographed sample rounds of ammunition from both boxes, and established that they were manufactured in the former Soviet Union.

22. It is not known what amount, if any, the ISIL faction paid for the shipment. One possibility is that the ISIL leadership demanded a percentage of the shipment in exchange for allowing it free passage. This scenario would be consistent with the Monitoring Group's assessment that the recapture of Qandala by Puntland forces in December 2016 has pushed the arms trade further east, necessitating that arms smugglers conduct their trade through territory controlled, at least partially, by the ISIL faction.

23. Figure 7, below, presents a network chart of the mobile phone activity in April 2017 for the key individuals involved in the *Fatah Al Khayr* arms smuggling operation. Over this period, Abdi Hassan Ali was in frequent contact with Said Yusuf Timowayne Mohamed a.k.a. Said Atto, supporting Ali's claim that Said Atto was the intended reseller of the pistols smuggled into Bosaso on-board the *Fatah Al Khayr*. Said Atto is also shown to be in contact with Ahmed Omar Ali, who has been identified as an arms dealer potentially affiliated with the ISIL faction.¹⁶

24. Abdi Mohamed Omar "Dhofaye" is also shown to be in frequent phone contact with both Buruj Mohamed Ali Farah and Mahad Isse Aden "Laboballe" in April, corroborating their central role in importing the arms shipment.


Figure 7: Phone network chart of the key individuals in the *Fatah Al Khayr* arms smuggling operation, April 2017.¹⁷



¹⁶ Information supplied by a former intelligence officer in Puntland. While the SEMG has not confirmed Ahmed Omar Ali's involvement in any illicit arms shipment, his phone activity strongly demonstrates that he is a member of Puntland arms smuggling networks.

¹⁷ The Monitoring Group is grateful to the Center for Advanced Defence Studies (C4ADS) in Washington DC for its assistance in conducting network analysis on the *Fatah Al Khayr* smuggling operation.


Figure 8: Storyboard of the flag verification boarding of the Fatah Al Khayr by the USS Hue City on 28 April 2017.



March 2017 Alula arms shipment

25. Figure 1, below, displays Mohamed Abdi Muse's relevant mobile phone activity from 3 to 9 March 2017, the time leading up to the Alula shipment. During this window, Muse made a total of 16 calls to three distinct Thuraya satellite devices, which the SEMG believes were on board the three dhows of Iranian origin delivering the shipment. Muse also shows phone contacts with a member of the Qandala-Hafun arms smuggling network, Abdimalik Mohamed Abdi Muse. Abdimalik Muse, like Mohamed Abdi Muse, had previously been in telephone contact with arms smugglers on board the Iran-registered dhow *Nasir*, which was interdicted en route to Somalia by the Australian naval vessel HMAS *Melbourne* on 24 September 2015 while carrying a cargo primarily comprised of 75 anti-tank missiles (see S/2016/919, annex 8.10). The above strongly suggests that Abdimalik Muse remains part of a network based in the Alula/Habo area with connections to arms smugglers in Iran.

Figure 1: Mohamed Abdi Muse's relevant mobile phone communications, 3-9 March 2017.¹⁸



¹⁸ The Monitoring Group is grateful to the Center for Advanced Defence Studies (C4ADS) in Washington DC for its assistance in conducting network analysis on Mohamed Abdi Muse's phone records.

Annex 7.1.1: Puntland interdiction of arms from Yemen

Figure 1: Skiff carrying arms en route from Yemen to Somalia, 22 September 2017, navigated by Buruj Mohamed Ali Farah.



Figure 2: Position of the skiff at 15:30 UTC +3 on 22 September 2017.




Figure 3: Arms seized by Puntland forces near Bosaso, 23 September 2017.



Annex 7.2: Maritime seizure of arms in March 2016 by FS *Provence*

1. On 20 March 2016, the French naval vessel FS *Provence*, operating as part of the Combined Task Force 150 of the Combined Maritime Forces, stopped and boarded a stateless dhow (tilly plate: 4/3972) approximately 150 km northeast of Alula, Puntland, which was heading toward Somalia. The dhow bore the markings of the shipping company “Al Mansoor CO SA”, and of “Konarak Iran” as home port. The captain was identified as “Sajed Arjamand” (see figure 1, below). A subsequent search of the vessel revealed a cargo of assault and sniper rifles, machine guns and anti-tank missiles.
2. Between 7 and 9 March 2017, the SEMG was granted access to weapons storages in France in order to conduct a thorough inspection. The SEMG has established the following facts with respect to this arms seizure:

Assault rifles

3. The 2,000 assault rifles had characteristics consistent with Iranian-produced KLS 7.62mm assault rifles, though no factory markings were observed. Their appearance suggested that they were newly manufactured. Many serial numbers among the 2,000 appear in sequential order, which raises the possibility that the rifles originated from state weapon storage (see figure 2, below).

Sniper rifles

4. The 64 sniper rifles documented in the seizure had characteristics consistent with Iranian-produced SVD sniper rifles (Hoshdar-M), though no factory markings were observed.¹⁹ Their appearance suggested that they were newly manufactured. Most of the serial numbers appear in sequential order, which raises the possibility that the originated from state weapon storage (see figure 3, below).

Anti-tank guided missiles

5. The nine anti-tank guided missiles documented in the seizure had characteristics consistent with Russian-produced 9M133-1 Kornets, manufactured in 2008 and assembled by the Konstruktorskoe Buro Priborostroeniya (KBP Instrument Design Bureau) in Tula, Russian Federation (see figure 4, below). On 1 June 2017, the SEMG sent a letter to the Russian Federation seeking additional information about the missiles, including copies of end user certificates.²⁰ The SEMG’s letter included box, missile, and assembled box serial numbers for each of the nine missiles, as well as 16 photographs of missile components. On 30 August 2017, the SEMG received a response indicating that “the information and documents provided by the SEMG do not unfortunately allow to identify the aforementioned missiles and answer the questions”.²¹

Machine guns

6. The six light machine guns have characteristics consistent with Type 73 light machine guns designed and manufactured in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). According to a defence analysis publication, the Islamic Republic of Iran appears as the only country to have an army equipped with the Type 73, apart from the DPRK.²² According to the intelligence consultancy Armament Research Services (ARES), “Iran received the Type 73 GPMG [general purpose machine gun] from North Korea, likely during the late 1970s to mid-1980s, and employed these weapons during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. Iran has continued to employ the Type 73 GPMG in a reserve role in recent years”.²³
7. On 3 May 2017, the SEMG sent a letter to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to obtain information about the possible export of Type 73 machine guns.²⁴ No response had been received as of this writing.
8. For photographs of the Type 73 machine guns, see figure 5, below.

¹⁹ Hoshdar-M sniper rifles manufactured by the Defence Industries Organization in Iran could also appear under the name “Nakhjir sniper rifles”.

²⁰ S/AC.29/2017/SEMG/OC.73.

²¹ Email from the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN, 1 June 2017.

²² IHS Jane’s, “Iran-Army”. Available from <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1767012> (accessed 18 September 2017; subscription required).

²³ Armament Research Services (ARES), “North Korean Type 73 GPMGs in Iraq, Syria & Yemen”, available from <http://armamentresearch.com/north-korean-type-73-gpmgs-in-iraq-syria-yemen> (accessed 18 September 2017).

²⁴ S/AC.29/2017/SEMG/OC.59.

Optical sights

9. The optical sights discovered in the same seizure were intended to be used with the SVD sniper rifles. The SEMG has obtained evidence that they were manufactured between 2014 and 2015 and were subsequently exported to an Iran-based company (see annex 7.2.1, strictly confidential).

10. During an SEMG mission to the Islamic Republic of Iran from 18 to 21 September, Iranian authorities assured the Group that they would investigate the case.

SEMG mission to the Islamic Republic of Iran

11. During an SEMG mission to the Islamic Republic of Iran from 18-21 September, Iranian authorities strongly denied any state involvement in the shipment of weapons to Somalia, adding that Iran had no strategic interests in Somalia. The authorities informed the Group that the owner of the company associated with the dhow that was boarded, Al Mansoor CO SA, had previously fled Iran owing approximately \$750,000 in unpaid taxes. They added that most Al Mansoor manufactured dhows had been resold to private individuals, with many sold to Pakistani nationals.

12. Iranian authorities also questioned the assessment that the assault rifles seized were Iranian-manufactured KLS-7.62mm rifles, and asked whether a Member State would make the mistake of including weapons with sequential serial numbers if it were involved in the smuggling of such weapons. They indicated that certain Member States were seeking to attribute the shipment to Iran.

13. Finally, the Iranian authorities assured the Monitoring Group that it would investigate the Iran-based company associated with the optical sights seized from the dhow.

Figure 1: Redacted copy of identity document belonging to Captain Sajed Arjamand of the stateless dhow boarded by FS Provence on 20 March 2016.



Figures 2: KLS 7 assault rifles seized by FS Provence.²⁵



²⁵ Serial numbers of the assault rifles are on file with the Secretariat.

Figure 3: SVD sniper rifles (Hoshdar-M) seized by FS Provence.²⁶



²⁶ Serial numbers of the sniper rifles are on file with the Secretariat.

Figure 4: Photographs of anti-tank guided missiles (9M133-1 Kornet) seized by FS Provence.²⁷



Figure 5: General-purpose machine guns (Type-73) seized by FS Provence.²⁸



²⁷ Box generic serials, missile serials and assembled box serials are on file with the Secretariat.

²⁸ Serial numbers are on file with the Secretariat.

Annex 7.2.1: Belarus sights (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*

Annex 8.1: Halane Central Armoury inspections, 26 April and 29 August 2017

26 April 2017 inspection

1. On 26 April 2017, the SEMG was given access to the Halane Central Armoury (Halane) located within the greater airport complex in Mogadishu. The SEMG surveyed all weapons and ammunition in the facility, as well as other non-lethal military equipment stored at the site.

2. The SEMG identified the following weapons and ammunition from a delivery of military equipment from the Arab Republic of Egypt in July 2016.²⁹:

- 6 Tokarev 9mm pistols;
- 58 AK-47-type assault rifles;
- 3 M91 sniper rifles;³⁰
- 4 signal pistols (with 320 red and white 26.5mm flares);
- 3 RPD machine guns;
- 7.62x54mm ammunition;³¹
- 7,200 rounds of 7.62x39mm ammunition.

3. Most of the weapons notified to the Committee had been recorded as marked and registered in the logbooks by the SNA. Nevertheless, the SEMG noted several discrepancies:

4. First, although 61 AK-47s had been notified as due for delivery, only 58 had been registered at Halane.³² Second, the shipment had been notified to the Committee as including 113,200 rounds of 7.62 x39mm ammunition. There was, however, no registration of ammunition from the shipment in the logbooks. The SEMG conducted its own count of this calibre of ammunition in the facility and noted 7,200 rounds. It was unclear therefore what quantity of ammunition had arrived at the facility, or had been distributed.

5. In addition to the materiel from the July 2016 Egypt shipment, the SEMG identified other materiel from previous consignments notified to the Committee:

- 9mm ammunition identified as part of a previous notified shipment;³³
- 7.62x25mm ammunition for Tokarev pistols;³⁴
- 7.62x54mm ammunition;³⁵
- 23 optical sights for Type 77 12.7mm anti-aircraft machine guns;³⁶

6. The SEMG also identified some obsolete material and ammunition already documented by the Group in 2011 and 2012 as materiel received from AMISOM and the former Transitional Federal Government (TFG):³⁷

- 25 obsolete 60mm mortar launchers;
- 29 obsolete RPG-7 launchers manufactured in 2010;

²⁹Advance delivery notification sent on 17 May 2016, reference: [S/AC.29/2016/NOTE.30](#), and post-delivery confirmation sent on 22 July 2016, reference: [S/AC.29/2015/NOTE.38](#).

³⁰Officials at Halane informed the SEMG that they were unable to mark these weapons as there was no space to do so.

³¹The SEMG was unable to distinguish between the quantities of 7.62x54mm ammunition in Halane originating in the 2016 Egypt consignment and that which formed part of a previous 2014 Egypt consignment.

³²It remained unclear whether these weapons had either not arrived with the consignment, or had already been distributed without registration or documentation.

³³UAE shipment notified in 2014, [S/AC.29/2014/NOTE.48](#) and a second UAE shipment notified in 2015, [S/AC.29/2015/NOTE.29](#).

³⁴Egypt shipment notified in 2014, [S/AC.29/2014/NOTE.67](#).

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷[S/2013/413](#), annex 6.1, paras. 52 to 55. Colonel Ahmed Moalim suggested to the SEMG that some of this stock might have been transferred by AMISOM to the facility during the TFG period, before the partial lift of the arms embargo.

- 25 obsolete RPG-2 launchers;
- Obsolete 81mm mortars launchers;
- Obsolete B-10 recoilless rifles;
- 14.5x114mm ammunition;³⁸ and
- 12.7x108mm ammunition.

29 August 2017 inspection

7. The SEMG accessed Halane again on 29 August 2017 and conducted a second limited survey of weapons and ammunition, as well as non-lethal military equipment, stored on site.

8. The last notified shipment of military equipment recorded in the Halane weapons and ammunition logbooks was from Djibouti, which had arrived in June.³⁹ By the time of the SEMG's visit, most of the consignment had already been distributed. The SEMG documented approximately 30 boxes of AK-47 ammunition in white wheat bags which were still in Halane.

9. The majority of the weapons and ammunition in Halane observed during the visit were from a consignment — according to correspondence sent by the FGS to the Committee⁴⁰ — from the People's Republic of China, which had arrived in Mogadishu on 7 August 2017. Officials at Halane informed the SEMG that they were in the process of marking and registering the weapons from the shipment. While the Group was unable to undertake a full inventory of the items due to time constraints, and the fact that the boxes were sealed, it was able to document and photograph the following items:

- DShK / Type 85 12.7mm anti-aircraft weapons, including mounts;
- Type 67-2 heavy machine guns;
- AK-47s pattern assault rifles;
- 38mm automatic anti-riot grenade launchers;
- 38mm tear gas cartridges;
- 7.62x39mm ammunition;
- 12.7mm ammunition;
- Type 69 40mm HEAT projectiles (rocket-propelled grenades); and
- a large quantity of PKM machine gun ammunition rounds.

10. The SEMG noted with concern that, on the day of the visit, there was only one officer engaged in marking the materiel which had arrived from China. General Ahmed Ibrahim Mohamed explained that the marking team had been reduced from 12 to five personnel which had affected the pace of the marking and registration process.

³⁸ Material subject to Committee approval further to paragraph 7 of resolution 2111 (2013).

³⁹ Advance delivery notification [S/AC.29/2017/NOTE.24](#).

⁴⁰ Letter from the FGS to the Committee, SOM/MSS /177/17, 21 August 2017.

Annex 8.2: Registration and distribution procedures at Halane

1. Distribution of weapons and ammunition is authorized by the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) of the Somali National Army (SNA). If the CDF is not available, the second in command may authorize distribution. The key documents generated during the process are:

- (a) Distribution order: the CDF issues a signed distribution order that includes the type, quantity, purpose, and receiving unit of the weapons and ammunition to be distributed. A copy of the distribution order must be kept at Office the CDF, another at Halane armoury, and a third with the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA).
- (b) Distribution voucher: vouchers are issued and signed by the Commander of Halane armoury or his deputy, based on receipt of a distribution order. A copy is kept at Halane, one is sent to the CDF, and a third to the receiving unit.
- (c) Logbook: the logbook template was designed by the Joint Verification Team (JVT) to allow for entry and exit of an item to be recorded on the same line for ease of tracking. There are two separate logbooks for weapons and ammunition, which are signed by the officer-in-charge.

Figure 1: Logbook template designed by the Joint Verification Team (JVT).

Ammunition distribution procedures

2. During its visit to Halane on 26 April 2017, the SEMG observed that the correct procedure was generally being implemented with respect to distribution of ammunition. An example of a correctly implemented distribution procedure is provided below, though the distribution order lacked specification to the unit level.

Figure 2: Distribution order dated 14 August 2016, authorizing Halane to deliver 8,640 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, 4,000 rounds of PKM ammunition and 640 rounds of DShK ammunition to SNA Sector 12.

Taliska Ciidanka Xoogga Dalka Soomaaliyeed
 r.Xabbat/XDS/94/16
 Taariikh: 14/08/16

نواب قائد الجيش الوطني
 الصو ماني للا مور الاداريه
 (التوجسيكيه)
 رقم:
 تاريخ:

DEPUTY COMMANDER OF SNA FOR LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION
 Office of the Deputy Commander

KU:-HOOGAANKA HUBKA IYO RASAASTA X.D.S = MUQDISHO=
 Ujeeddo: - Bixin Rasaas
 Hoogaanka Hubka iyo Rasaasta waxaa lafarayaa in uu siiyo Taliyaha
 Qeybta 12. APRIL Rasaasta hoos ku qoran:
 I. Rasaas

NO	Nooca Rasaasta	Tirada Sanduuqa
1	Rasaasta AK47	8640 sideed kun lix boqol iyo afaratan xabaddood
2	Rasaasta PKM	4000 afar kun xabaddood
3	Rasaas DSHK	640 lix boqol iyo afaratan xabaddood

S/Gaalo
 Kusimaha Taliyaha X.D.S ahna Abb.daalaha Ar.Taakuleynta iyo Maamulka X.D.S
 Cabdulqaadir Macalim Nuru

Taliska Ciidanka Xoogga Dalka Soomaaliyeed
 Office of the Deputy Commander
 Telephone: +252-615836892/0695002024
 Email: -debsaf@gmail.com

Figure 3: Completed distribution voucher signed by the Halane commander.

TALISKA CIIDANKA XOOGGA DALKA SOOMAALIYEED
 HOGGAANKA HUBKA IYO RASAASTA
 Taariikh: 16/8/16

Boonada Amar Bixinta Rasaasta No. 051
 Maqaasiinka Dhexe: HALANE waxaa lafarayaa in aad Urarto Colka GR. 12 Abriis

T/T	Taariikh	Nooca	Tirada	Culeyska	Fiira gaar ah
1.	16/08/2016	AK47	8.640//		
2.		B.K.M	4.000//		
3.		D.S.H.K	640//		
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					

Saxiixa Qaataha
 Lt. Abdielahi Osman

Saxiixa Madaxa H.Hubka & Rasaasta
 G/Sare Axmed Macalin